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Accidents, discoveries of pollution, safety violations, product tampering epi-
sodes and other "unfortunate events" occurring within complex industrial . 
systems can be conceptualised as pebbles dropped in a pond. The impacts 
of such events ripple outward, encompassing first the directly affected 
victims and property, then the responsible company or agency, and-in the 
extreme-engulfing other companies, agencies, and industries. Some 
events make only small ripples; others make large ones, often labelled "in-
dustrial crises". This paper explores characteristics of unfortunate events 
and the ways they are managed that affect the breadth and seriousness of 
the resulting impacts. In doing so, we point toward the development of 
models that may help companies forecast and avoid industrial crises. 
Complex industrial sys.terns inevitably give rise to "unfortunate events" 
which vary in type (e.g., accidents, discoveries of pollution, safety violations, 
product tampering episodes, etc.) and severity. Cost/benefit and risk/benefit 
analyses typically assess the impacts of such events in terms of direct harm 
. to victims (e.g. deaths, injuries, and damages). Methods exist for attaching 
I 
probabilities to these direct effects and translating them into monetary costs 
or disutility indices (Mishan, 1971; Raiffa, 1968; Wilson & Crouch, 1982). 
The impacts of an unfortunate event, however, sometimes extend far 
beyond these direct harmful effects, and may include significant indirect 
costs (both monetary and nonmonetary) to the responsible private company 
or government agency that far exceed direct costs. In some cases, all com-
panies in an industry are affected, regardless of which company was respon-
sible for the mishap. In truly extreme cases, the indirect costs of a mishap 
may even extend past industry boundaries, affecting companies, industries, 
and agencies whose business is minimally related to the initial event. Thus, 
an unfortunate event can be thought of as a pebble dropped in a pond. The 
ripples extend in concentric circles, encompassing first the directly affected 
victims, then the responsible company or agency, and, in the extreme, en-
gulfing other companies, agencies, and industries. Some events make only 
small ripples; others make larger ones, often labeled "industrial crises." This 
paper explores how characteristics associated with an unfortunate event 
and the way it is managed act upon perceptions of risk in ways that affect the 
breadth and seriousness of those impacts. In doing so, we poin_t toward the 
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' development of models that may help companies and agencies forecast and 
avoid industrial crises. 
Early Theories of Impact 
Early theories linked the seriousness and magnitude of impact of acci-
dents to the number of people killed or injured, or to the amount of property 
damaged (Ferreira & Slesin, 1976; Griesmeyer & Okrent, 1981; Wilson, 1975). 
However, the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear reactor in 1979 
provided a dramatic demonstration that factors besides injury, death, and 
property damage impose serious co§ts. Despite the fact that not a single 
person died at TMI and few if any latent cancer fatalities are expected (Presi-
dent's Commission, 1979), no other accident in our history has produced 
such costly societal impacts. The accident at TMI devastated the utility that 
owned and operated the plant. It also imposed enormous costs (estimated at 
$500 billion by one source) on the nuclear industry and on society, through 
stricter regulation (resulting in increased construction and operating costs), 
reduced operation of reactors worldwide, greater public opposition to nu-
clear power, and reliance on more expensive energy sources (EPRI Journal, 
1980; Evans & Hope, 1984; Heising & George, 1986). It may even have led to a 
more hostile view of other complex technologies, such as chemical manu-
facturing and genetic engineering. The point is that traditional economic 
and risk analyses tend to neglect these higher-order impacts, hence they 
greatly underestimate the costs associated with certain kinds of mishaps. 
Although reaction to the TMI accident was extreme, it is by no means an 
isolated example. Other recent events that have had enormous indirect im-
pacts include the chemical manufacturing accident at Bhopal, India; acci-
dents resulting from the defective fuel tank of the Ford Pinto; the discovery 
of pollution from chemical wastes at Love Canal, New York and Times 
Beach, Missouri; the Tylenol tamperings; the disastrous launch of the space 
shuttle Challenger; and the reactor meltdown at Chernobyl. Following these 
extreme events are a myriad of lesser events varying in the breadth and mag-
nitude of their impacts. 
New theories and methods of analysis are needed to forecast costly 
ripple effects so that they may be factored into risk-management decisions. 
Concepts and methods derived from the study of perceived risk form a first 
step toward developing a model for understanding and predicting these 
sorts of impacts. 
Perceived Risk and the Psychometric Paradigm 
One approach to assessing the higher order costs of risk-related events 
has evolved from research on risk perception during the past decade. This 
work has employed psychometric scaling techniques along with multivariate 
methods such as factor analysis to produce quantitative representations of 
people's risk attitudes and perceptions (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & -
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I Lichtenstein, 1985). This same methodological approach may be able to pro-
: duce a more adequate model of higher-order impacts. · 
Within the psychometric paradigm, researchers have asked experts and 
lay people to judge·the riskiness of diverse sets of hazardous activities, sub-
; Stances, and technologies and to judge the need for regulation of these 
hazards. These judgements have then been related to other judgments about 
the hazard's status on various characteristics of risk, such as the degree to 
which exposure to the hazard is voluntary or controllable, whether its conse-
quences evoke feelings of dread, whether its effects can be catastrophic or 
passed on to future generations, whether its risks are known to science or to 
those exposed to them, and so on. 
Many of these risk characteristics are highly correlated with each other, 
across the set of hazards. For example, hazards rated as "voluntary" tend 
also to be rated as "controllable" and "well known"; hazards that are judged 
to threaten future generations tend also to be seen as having catastrophic 
potential, and so on. Subjecting these correlations to factor analysis has 
shown that a rather large set of characteristics can be condensed into a 
small set of higher-order characteristics or factors, as shown in Figures 1 
and 2. 
We have found that lay people's risk perceptions and attitudes are 
closely related to the position of a hazard within this sort of factor space. 
Specifically, the higher a hazard's score on the factor "Dread Risk" (e.g., the 
further it is to the right of the space), the higher is its perceived risk, the 
more people want to see its current risks reduced, and the more they want to 
see strict regulation employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk 
(Figure 3). 
Accidents as Signals 
An important concept that has emerged from risk-perception research is 
the notion that the societal cost of an accident or mishap is determined, in 
part, by what that event signals or portends (Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fisch-
hoff, 1984). The informativeness or signal potential of a mishap, and thus its 
potential social impact, appears to be systematically related to the charac-
teristics of the risk and thus to the location of the event within the factor 
space (see Figure 4). An accident that takes many lives may produce rela-
tively little social disturbance (beyond that caused the victims' families and 
friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well understood system (e.g. a 
train wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one per-
ceived as poorly understood), such as a nuclear reactor, space vehicle, or a 
recombinant DNA-laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is 
perceived as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps. 
The concept of accidents as signals was eloquently expressed in an edi-
torial addressing the tragic accident in Bhopal, India: "What truly grips us in 
these accounts [of disaster] is not so much the numbers as the spectacle of 
suddenly vanishing competence, of men utterly routed by technology, of 
fail-safe systems failing with a logic as inexorable as it was once-indeed, 
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Figure 1. Location of 90 hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships among 
18 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics as indicated 
-- _py the lower diagram: §ource: Slavic et al., 1985. _ . _ . 
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right up until that very moment-untorseeable.-And the spectacle haunts us 
because it seems to carry allegorical import, like the whispery omen of a 
hovering future" (The New Yorker; February 18, 1985). 
The concept of accidents as signals helps explain society's relatively 
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I Figure 2. Location of 81 hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships among 
1
1
18 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics, as indicated 
by the lower diagram. Source: Slovic, Fischhoff, and b,ichtenstein, 1985. . 
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strong response to nuclear power mishaps and, in particular, the TMI acci-
dent. Because reactor risks are characterized as poorly understood and cat-
astrophic, accidents may be seen as omens of disaster, thus producing 
ripple effects resulting in great costs to the industry and society. One impli-
cation of this is that effort and expense beyond that indicated by a cost/ben-
efit analysis might be warranted to reduce the possibility of small but fright-
ening reactor accidents. A more general implication of the signal conception 
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Figure 3. Attitudes toward regulation of the hazards in Figure 2. The larger the point, the 
greater the desire for strict regulation to reduce risk. · 
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is that any unfortunate events involving hazards that are perceived as poorly 
understood and catastrophic have the potential to produce large ripples. 
This same type of analysis has also been applied to diverse hazard sce-
narios within a single technological domain such as railroad transport 
(Kraus & Slavic, in press) or automobiles (Slavic, MacGregor, & Kraus, 1987). 
Kraus and Slavic constructed 49 railroad hazard scenarios varying with re-
spect to type of train, type of cargo, location of the accident, and the nature 
and cause of the accident (e.g., "A high-speed train carrying passengers 
through a mountain tunnel derails due to a mechanical system failure"). The 
results showed that these railroad hazards were highly differentiated, just 
like the hazards in Figures 1 and 2. The highest signal potential (and thus the 
highest potential for large ripple effects) was associated with accidents in-
volving trains carrying hazardous chemicals. 
The study by Slavic, MacGregor and Kraus examined perceptions of risk 
and signal value for 40 structural defects in automobiles. Multivariate anal-
ysis of these defects, which were rated in terms of various characteristics of 
risk, predicted judgments of riskiness and signal value quite well. One defect 
stood out in this analysis, much as nuclear power has stood out in previous 
studies. It was a fuel tank rupture upon impact, creating the possibility of a 
fire and burn injuries. This, of course, is the infamous design problem that _ 
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; Figure 4. Relation between signal potential and risk characterization for 30 hazards in Figure 
2. The larger the point, the greater the degree to which an accident involving that hazard was 
judged to "serve as a warning signal for society, providing new information about the 
probability that similar.or even more destructive mishaps might occur within this type of 
activity." The higher-order costs of a mishap are likely to be correlated with signal potential. 
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Source: Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff, 1984. 
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plagued the Ford Pinto and that Ford had allegedly declined to correct be-
cause a cost/benefit analysis indicated that the costs greatly exceeded the 
expected benefits from increased safety. Had Ford done a psychometric 
analysis such as ours, the analysis might have highlighted this particular de-
fect as one whose seriousness and higher-order costs (e.g. lawsuits, damage 
to the company's reputation) were likely to be greatly underestimated by 
their cost/benefit analysis. 
Research Directions 
We are presently conducting research along two fronts, theoretical and 
empirical, in order to improve our ability to forecast costly ripple effects. On 
the theoretical side we are attempting to develop a much broader view of the 
negative impacts that might result from unfortunate events and to cast a 
wider net to uncover characteristics that might predict the seriousness of 
those impacts. The theoretical framework that we develop will then be used 
to design a program of empirical research. 
Figure 5 illustrates some key elements of a theoretical analysis of im-
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Figure 5. A model of impact for unfortunate events. 
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pacts that might affect corporations and industries. We begin with an Event 
E, which could be a threatening sign (a defective component, discovery of 
pollution) or accident in a particular hazard domain. This event can be char-
acterized on a number of dimensions Ec1, Ec2, ... , EcN that are presumed to 
determine the interpretation that people give to that event (e.g., its signal 
value, seriousness, etc.). This interpretation will determine the event's 
spread of impact, from immediate victims to the effects on the company and, 
in extreme cases, to effects on the industry and beyond. The impacts them-
selves are multidimensional, including loss of sales, new regulatory con-
straints, litigation, community opposition, and loss of investor confidence. 
Our objective is to elaborate this framework by specifying, for a broad range 
of events, the relevant characteristics and the factors that affect their inter-
pretation and impact. 
A more complete framework would incorporate the role of intervening 
variables likely to mediate the relationship between event characteristics and 
impacts. For example, media response to an event is likely to be a strong 
determiner of interpretation and impact, as is the response of activist groups 
such as the Sierra Club or the National Resources Defense Council. Reputa- · 
tion, trust, and management competence are other elements likely to come 
into play. 
In the near term, it is not likely that the monetary costs associated with 
the impacts in Figure 5 could be forecasted precisely. A more reasonable 
objective is to identify events that might produce big ripples so that decision 
makers could consider such warnings in their qualitative deliberations. 
One of the first tasks in testing the theory will be to generate a universe 
of potentially important event characteristics. The literature on perceived 
risk and signal value suggests the importance of characteristics pertaining 
to the type of technology (new vs. old), the nature of the effects (contained 
... 
: vs. catastrophic; immediate vs. delayed; dreaded or not dreaded), and the 
I • 
· nature of the risk (voluntary vs. involuntary; known vs. unknown). 
We shall rely heavily on analysis of case histories of unfortunate past . 
events to generate · additional ideas about relevant characteristics and their 
. relationship to other variables in the theory. We have assembled a candidate 
set of about 100 diverse events, including production or manufacturing de-
fects (e.g., botulism in Bon Vivant Soup), discoveries of pollution (e.g., spills 
of dioxin and PCBs, EDB in grain), chronic health hazards (asbestos, TRIS in 
pajamas, Thalidomide), acute health hazards (Dalkon Shield IUDs, Legion-
naire's disease), external threats such as sabotage or terrrorism (Tylenol 
tampering, skyjacking), transportation accidents (collision of the two 747's 
at Tenerife, DC-10), construction flaws (the Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse), 
and accidents in space technology (Skylab, the shuttle Challenger). Prelimi-
nary examination suggests that the existence of identifiable or well-known 
victims, evidence of criminal behavior or coverup, and evidence of prior 
warnings will be important event characteristics emerging from these case 
studies. The goal of this research is to generate a large matrix of events and 
characteristics describing these events which can be subjected to psycho-
metric analysis to determine the key factors that predict the nature and mag-
nitude of ripple effects. 
Conclusion 
Perceived risk leads to social and economic consequences that form a 
reality which must be considered in risk management. The approach out-
lined in this paper should be a valuable supplement to risk analysis or cost-
benefit analysis, making risk managers aware of, and better able to evaluate, 
the full costs associated with their decisions. This should enable resources 
to be allocated more wisely to prevent corporate, industrial, and personal 
tragedies. 
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